The fiscal adjustments undertaken varied considerably between countries. On the revenue side, most made significant efforts to increase their public revenue, using two main strategies. One was the massive privatization of public companies inherited from the old planned economy model, while the second was the broadening of the taxable bases corresponding to previously established income taxes, in addition to the introduction of value added taxes, the improvement of tax collection systems and the implementation of intensive plans to combat tax evasion.
With regard to public expenditure, improvement proved difficult to achieve. The strong social pressures inherent in the transition from totalitarian states to democratic societies caused expenditure on public services to double, on average. In fact, in some cases, such as those of Latvia, Slovakia or Slovenia, social security reforms were minimal, despite the repeated recommendations of the European authorities (European Commission, 2001 ).
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that while some candidate countries consolidated their public finances to an acceptable degree, others still have important reforms pending. Furthermore, significant differences can be observed in the adjustment strategies designed and applied in the different states. Thus, while various countries, such as Bulgaria, decided to make shorter, sharper adjustments, others opted to implement them more slowly and gradually. In addition, it is clear that some countries, such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia, designed their consolidation processes on the basis of strategies which were generally aimed at improving revenue collection. Others, such as Hungary, Lithuania or Poland opted instead for expenditure-based adjustments.
In order to explain the differences observed in fiscal adjustment strategies, the literature has typically referred to institutional factors related to the forms of fiscal governance,predictably, were paramount in designing the various adjustment strategies throughout this period.
Consequently, the objective of the present study is to determine the influence that the recently reformed budgetary institutions in these countries may have had upon the results of budgetary consolidation, as observed in their public finances. Although these newly formed budgetary institutions may not yet be completely consolidated, we want to test if such "fresh" institutions have started to shape fiscal outcomes in new member states, as "old" EU-15 institutions did in the past. To answer this question, this article performs an empirical analysis of a sample of new EU member states (those who joined in 2004 and 2007) for the period 1993-2004. 3 This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the most recent fiscal developments in the new member states. Section 3 analyses the budgetary processes which configure their fiscal institutions. Section 4 constructs the indexes associated with these budgetary institutions. Section 5 deals with the possible influence that political decentralization may have had on the budgetary institutions of these countries. Section 6 presents the econometric model, as well as the results of various estimations of the relationship between budgetary procedures and the levels of fiscal discipline achieved by the various countries considered. Finally, Section 7 provides a summary of the main results and a discussion of their most important implications.
Fiscal consolidation episodes in the new member states
This section analyses the budgetary consolidation episodes undertaken between 1993 and 2004 in the new EU member states. Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for the budget balance and the annual variation of public expenditure (both expressed as a percentage of GDP) for the countries studied.
As the tables show, while the average budget balance has remained stable, ranging from -2.5 to -4.2 per cent of GDP, important differences exist between the countries in the sample. Some of them, such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria or Slovakia, have recorded budget deficits above 10 per cent of GDP, while others, such as Estonia, have experienced considerable surpluses in some financial years. This period reveals a continuous reduction of total public expenditure as a proportion of GDP between 1994 and , with the exception of 1999 and 2002. Again, public expenditure behaviour is highly heterogeneous, with spending cuts above 10 percent of GDP in countries such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and increases in this ratio above 5 percentage points in Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
Let us define fiscal adjustment episodes as those years in which the budget balance improved by at least 0.5 per cent of GDP with respect to the preceding ----- year. 4 Table 2 shows that, throughout the period, important fiscal adjustment episodes occurred, of varying duration and intensity among countries. Together with the variation in terms of simple budget balance, this table also displays the figures for the primary deficit or surplus and the reductions in public debt, all expressed in terms of GDP.
As the most important studies in this field indicate, any government faced with the necessity of reducing its budget deficit must design a four-dimensional fiscal adjustment strategy.
5 Thus, it must decide: 1) the size of the adjustment it wishes to undertake; 2) when the adjustment is to begin; 3) its expected duration; and 4) which budget items will be affected (i.e. the composition of the adjustment).
The size and duration of fiscal consolidations are very important, since short and intensive consolidations may produce a recession. This occurs when the private sector does not compensate quickly enough for the reduction in demand caused by a restrictive fiscal policy. By contrast, if fiscal consolidations are slow and sustained they may have extremely negative political results for the government responsible. Additionally, the duration of the consolidations is closely linked to their composition, insofar as adjustments which are fundamentally based on cuts in the government wage bill and public transfers are expected to last longer and be more successful than those based on an increase in public revenue and a reduction in public investment (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) .
To reduce the public deficit, any government has five options: 1) to increase public revenue more than public expenditure: 2) to increase public revenue and freeze expenditure; 3) to increase public revenue and reduce expenditure; 4) to freeze public revenue and reduce expenditure; and 5) to reduce revenue less than expenditure. Basically, consolidations founded on the first two adjustment strategies may be called "revenue-based adjustments", and those based on the last two "expenditure-based adjustments". The third possibility is, in reality, an intermediate alternative, and thus may be termed a "mixed strategy". -----4 The threshold for the selection of adjustment episodes varies in the literature, ranging from improvements in the budgetary balance of at least 0.5 per cent of GDP (Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados, 2005) to improvements of 1.5 per cent of GDP (von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch, 2001) . Following the most important studies of this question, we have defined fiscal consolidation episodes as those where the amelioration of the budget balance was at least 0.5 per cent of GDP for two consecutive years. Most OECD studies use cyclically-adjusted figures to select adjustment episodes, and they calculate the cyclical component based on the trend output gap. Only Afonso et al. (2006) has applied the same technique to new member states. Nevertheless, other authors as Zápal et al. (2006) avoid using cyclically-adjusted data given the specific characteristics of these countries. We are also reluctant to calculate cyclically-adjusted figures based on trend figures calculated with the HP-filter due to two factors: first, these economies came from socialist systems and the initial shock in their output at the beginning of the nineties would potentially bias any trend estimation for the first years in the sample; and second, if you only focus on the mid-nineties onwards, the time-series of data are too short to apply the HP-technique without biasing the estimations for the last 3 years (which in this case represent an important part of the sample). Therefore, we follow Zápal (2006) and select adjustment episodes in New Member States using noncyclically-adjusted data, and we will later use the GDP growth as a right-hand side variable to control the effect that output has on fiscal variables. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) ; Alesina and Perotti (1995) ; Alesina and Ardagna (1998); von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch (2001); and Mulas-Granados (2006) . Source: Own elaboration. Note: in terms of annual reduction of public deficit greater than 0.5 of GDP for at least two years. Table 2 shows that between 1994 and 2004 eleven fiscal adjustment episodes can be identified in our sample (thirteen including Malta) when the criterion adopted is the annual reduction of public deficit greater than 0.5 of GDP for at least two years. Table 3 shows that Slovakia and Latvia performed two adjustments, while the remaining countries only undertook one. When cross-country comparisons are made, these adjustment episodes differed in terms of timing, duration, size and comparison. The majority of adjustment episodes lasted for only two years, with the exceptions of Estonia (four years) and Lithuania (three years). On average, such adjustments reduced the deficit by 8.0 percentage points of GDP, although if we exclude the extreme value (30.4 per cent) displayed by Slovakia in the early years of the period, this average value falls to 5.8 per cent. However, dispersion is considerable within the sample (the standard deviation is 5.0), as both intensive and more modest adjustment processes existed.
Finally, it must be emphasised that the majority of the 40 annual adjustment in our sample were expenditure-based (25 years, or 62.5 per cent of the total), while 10 (25 per cent) were revenue-based, and only 5 (12.5 per cent) followed a mixed strategy. If we focus our attention on the 11 consolidation episodes (including at least two consecutive years) we observe instead 6 pure expenditure-based adjustments. The five remaining episodes includes different combinations. While Bulgaria (1997-98) , Latvia (1996-97) and Slovakia (1997-98) combine expenditurebased adjustments in the first year with revenue-based adjustments in the second year, the Czech Republic (1996-97) firstly adopted an adjustment based on expenditure and after one mixed. In the longest episode (2000-03), Estonia combined the three types of fiscal adjustment.
Note that selecting episodes according to the criteria that we have specified above turns out to provide very similar results to those reported by Zápal et al. (2006) , although they use a slightly different sample and definition of adjustment episodes. Any how, this experience of fiscal consolidation in the new member states differs substantially from the experience of fiscal adjustments in the EU-15, where most consolidation episodes were revenue-based rather than expenditure-based (Mulas-Granados, 2006 ). The differences in economic and welfare state development between both groups of countries probably account for the observed divergence in fiscal adjustment strategies (Purfield, 2003) .
Fiscal institutions in the new member states
The most relevant studies in the field of budget institutions identify three consecutive phases in the annual budget process:
6 the budget planning phase, the discussion and parliamentary approval phase and the execution phase, which includes possible amendments to the budget approved by the -----6 Von Hagen (1992); von Hagen and Harden (1994); Halleberg et al. (2001) ; Gleich (2003) and Yalloutinen (2004) .
Parliament.
7 Each of these phases includes the main procedures that affect the configuration of the budget institution of each country. The allocation of competencies and the way in which they are exercised by the Finance Minister, the executive and the legislature are also crucial aspects of the budget institution. These characteristics will be quantitatively evaluated, using the indexes proposed in the following section.
In the planning and design phase the fundamental role is played by the executive. From the construction of the pluriannual macroeconomic and budgetary frameworks to the allocation of funds, the decision-making capacity lies between the Finance Minister and the collegial body to which he/she belongs, i.e. the Council of Ministers. The competencies allocated in this phase and, complementarily, the residual decision-making powers, reflect the different options for institutional design which, at their extremes, range from a strong Finance Minister (i.e. with the power to lead the budget project presented to Parliament) to a collegial system of negotiation. In this phase, technical instruments and tax regulations which favour fiscal discipline can be incorporated into the budget institution, which is especially important for those new member states whose objective is to join EMU. Thus, the design of Pre-Accession Economic Programmes, similar to the Stability and Convergence Programmes required of the euro-countries, offers a test of the "quality" of the instruments incorporated into the budget process.
In the discussion and parliamentary approval phase, the relevant agents are, by definition, the political parties. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the residual power which the parliamentary system gives to the executive and, in particular, to the Finance Minister. Thus, the evaluation of the budget process should consider the effective capacity of the Finance Minister to maintain, following its debate in Parliament, the project as initially presented.
In the execution phase, the predominant role is once again played by the Finance Minister. An accurate description of the budget institution must take into account his/her powers to control the execution of the budgetary allocations, which may even include the establishment of spending limits. In fact, in recent decades the literature regarding fiscal discipline has demonstrated the importance of this phase, since it permits last-minute amendments to the budget approved by Parliament. The Finance Minister's veto power over Parliament's proposals for increases in budget allocations and transfers between budgetary items has proved essential to guarantee fiscal discipline in the medium term.
The literature on the institutional aspects of fiscal consolidations does not usually consider the control of budget execution as a specific phase. Although from a macroeconomic point of view this is an essential function within budget management, its influence upon the development of fiscal policy lacks sufficient weight for it to be included in this approximation.
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The interactions between the decision-making powers of the Finance Minister and of Parliament become strongly evident in this phase of execution. On occasion, the concentration of the competences of Parliament with regard to budgetary amendments has been argued to be positive. However, the experience of the last two decades has, in many countries, demonstrated the importance of the Finance Minister's power to control the budget. The principal explanation is that the assumption of responsibility for the financial panorama by Members of Parliament is hardly credible, given that they are not judged at the polls, at least in the short term, for the failures of budgetary policy. Note: The year in which the variable modifies its previous value is given in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration, using the information provided by the websites of the institutions of each country and by the survey performed by Yalloutinen (2004) . Table 6 Budget Note: The year in which the variable modifies its previous value is given in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration, using the information provided by the websites of the institutions of each country and by the survey performed by Yalloutinen (2004) .
Appendix I presents an ordered list of the different variables considered in each of the three stages of the budget process. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show the values taken by all these variables for the countries studied. The existence of significant changes in the values caused by important reforms is marked with a specific reference to the year in which the reform took place.
Indexes for the budget institutions in the new member states
Since the pioneering work by von Hagen (1992), various studies have attempted to gather together the qualitative aspects which define budget institutions, understood in their broadest sense, in a numerical index or indexes. Allowing for (sometimes considerable) differences, all the proposals for this type of index are based on the systematisation of the information available regarding the characteristics and functioning of all those processes, rules, agreements and protocols which govern a given country's budget process. Thus, most studies have gathered together in their indexes all the information available for the different phases of the budget process.
Following and expending this line of research, we propose a series of indexes which incorporate into the essential formulation of von Hagen's (1992) indexes some additional elements that we believe may be relevant to understand the role of the budget institution in the countries studied.
Firstly, we define three indexes, which capture the three phases of the budget process: the budgetary planning and programming phase, the parliamentary discussion and approval phase, and the execution phase. These three indexes are then aggregated into an overall index which allows us to establish a ranking of budget institutions. In this aggregation, the three phases considered are weighted equally. In contrast to the proposal made by Gleich (2003) , we have opted for an equal distribution of the weights assigned to each process because we believe that this reduces the discretionary bias which the configuration of this type of qualitative indexes inherently generates. Furthermore, we believe there exists no justification for placing more importance upon certain aspects of the budget process, since all information is equally relevant for our analysis.
To standardise this weight, we decided to linearly distribute the value of 10 points assigned to each of the three principal budget phases among the total variables, each of which had previously been equalised at the maximum value they could potentially attain, so that they contributed equally to each of the procedures included for each phase. The corresponding coefficient of each variable is then applied directly to the values which comprise the established quantification range. These ranges adopt higher or lower values, depending on the greater or lesser influence which each has upon budgetary discipline.
With regard to the values of each variable, we tried to reduce their variability. As a general rule, in those cases with dichotomic values, the pair 1-0 was chosen if the worst behaviour is in direct contradiction to budgetary discipline, and a 2-1 pair type if the worst behaviour is not directly opposed to this essential aspect of fiscal policy. For those situations where we believe that discrimination is significant, we introduced intermediate values, even if they exceeded 2. Whatever the case, our aim was to minimise the discretionality associated to an excessive number of categories for each variable, or by the unjustified differentiation of the maximum values that these may attain.
On the basis of these criteria, we define the following indexes for each process: a) Institutional index for the design phase (budget planning and programming): Tables 7 and 8 display the quantification obtained for the three indexes proposed and for the whole sample. Table 7 offers information for the overall index, which results from the aggregation of the three basic indexes, each weighted at 1/3, while Table 8 Table 9 shows the ranking of the ten countries in our sample for the two alternative indexes. The number 1 corresponds to the maximum value computed in the corresponding index and represents the governance model of the budget institution which, in accordance with the criteria established, most favours fiscal discipline. Insofar as our two alternative indexes have been constructed on the basis of the concept of "the decision-making power of the Finance Minister", this maximum value reflects the budget institution design with which the Finance Minister feels strongest. This table also shows similar rankings to those obtained by Gleich (2003) and Yalloutinen (2004) . -----9 To calculate the overall index in this second alternative, we have assigned an identical weight (0.25) to the four principal indices examined. Note: The year in which the variable modifies its previous value is given in parentheses. Source: Authors' compilation, using the information provided by the websites of the institutions of each country and by the survey performed by Yalloutinen (2004) . (1) In those countries displaying various values, the average weighted value has been calculated, according to the number of years.
(2) The ranking of the Gleich and Yalloutinen indices is that established by the authors in their studies.
As can be observed, there are important similarities between the three rankings, especially in the case of our second ranking and that of Yalloutinen (2004) . There are also some similarities with the ranking by Gleich (2003) , especially if we exclude the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and Bulgaria. Our indexes place the Czech Republic in the penultimate and final position, respectively (as in Yalloutinen's study), while Gleich's work places them in an intermediate position. Similar differences apply for the other countries, although none is particularly striking.
Using the information supplied by our principal indexes, we test whether the characterisation of each country's budget institution matches the prediction made in the previous section regarding the form of governance of the budget process. On the one hand, as shown in Table 4 , Slovenia and Hungary are the two countries whose institutional variables clearly behave as predicted by the delegation approach. If we observe the role played by the Finance Minister, not only in the design phase (Table 4) , but also in the phases of parliamentary approval (Table 5) and execution (Table 6 ), it is evident that both countries are paradigmatic examples of the delegation approach. This is so because the most important variables that determine the "strong" role of the Finance Minister are present in both countries, and coincide with those which require the cession of authority characteristic of the delegation model. Estonia and Lithuania also display values fairly representative of the delegation model, although it seems that their electoral systems have forced them to adopt certain typical features of the compromise model. Romania, since the significant reforms of the year 2000 and, above all, 2003, may also be considered to be in transition towards the delegation approach.
At the other extreme are countries such as Estonia, which have been immersed in electoral processes resulting in continuous pacts to form coalition governments, thereby generating fiscal processes very close to the compromise approach. The Czech Republic and Poland are two other cases in which the role of the Finance Minister has been largely conditioned by the formation of alliances for government. In the remaining countries, the initial instability of their political systems have produced characteristics typical of what we define as the "feudal" model, with highly fragmented scenarios of budgetary decision-making and difficulties in taking into account the long term consequences of fiscal policy decisions.
Whatever the case, it must be remembered that our study has concentrated on a set of Eastern and Central European countries which have all emerged from the former Soviet bloc. This has given rise to the rapid introduction of democratic political institutions and the construction, practically ex novo, of a public sector based on principles and criteria which have prevailed for many decades in developed market economy countries. Thus, the institutional framework of these countries is an evolutionary one, which prevents us from undertaking a characterisation as robust as that of other research, notably the recent study performed by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2004) for the 15 countries which were members of the European Union prior to its widening in May 2005.
As time goes by, this exercise will become more robust. But we nevertheless believe that these informational weaknesses, related to the ongoing process of institution building in the new member states, must not impede attempts to understand the effect that these newly born institutions have had on the fiscal outcomes of the last decade.
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The impact of decentralisation on fiscal policy
The influence of public sector decentralisation on fiscal outcomes at the national level is undeniable and has been systematically confirmed in empirical studies. As a consequence, most scholars in the field affirm that the adoption of fiscal rules capable of coordinating the fiscal policy of the various levels of government is crucial for budgetary discipline (Balassone, Franco and Zotteri, 2003, 2004) .
In spite of this evidence, most new member states where decentralisation of spending has taken place have not yet coordinated their fiscal policies between the different levels of government. For example, in the Czech Republic there exists no specific legal rule to coordinate the distinct levels of government with spending capacities. However, the national government retains control over the revenue of regional governments, insofar as the latter are substantially dependent upon transfers from the central government; local governments, in turn, must inform the central government every six months of the evolution of the budget. In addition, although borrowing restrictions for local councils were eliminated in 2001, a sanctions mechanism exists for cases where solvency is at risk.
The Baltic states employ different types of controls, although no explicit coordination rules exist. For example, in Estonia legal limits govern the financial obligations which subcentral governments may incur. The principal restriction is local governments' borrowing limit of 60 per cent of their annual revenue, while debt service payments must not exceed 20 per cent of the total revenue (net of transfers from the central government). Latvia introduced the legal obligation for all local councils to supply regular budgetary information to the Ministry of Finance. These local governments have full powers to assume debt, respecting the limits established in the annual Budget Law. The accumulated volumes are evaluated by a central body accountable to the central government. An internal mechanism of financing through borrowing, which provides for state loans to local councils, has existed since 1998. Finally, Lithuania established the legal obligation for local governments to provide balanced budgets (with no public deficit), although during each financial year councils with financing necessities may choose to receive loan financing from the state.
In Hungary, the Local Authorities Law established a series of restrictions upon local government borrowing. Furthermore, a series of rules exist for the incorporation of local budgets into the pluriannual budgetary framework designed by the Ministry of Finance. These rules concern the sources of financing, through both taxation and central government transfers. In general, the limitations are not particularly operative. With regard to Poland and Hungary, there exists no specific legal framework for fiscal policy coordination. The existing rules are focused on limiting local borrowing, and establish successive limits which prohibit further borrowing when the figure of 60 per cent is exceeded.
Similarly, no legal framework exists in the Republic of Slovenia for the coordination of budgetary policies between levels of government. However, the Ministry of Finance must authorize local government borrowing, the maximum level of which is also limited by law, and this practice has proved to be quite effective. Slovakia, has adopted a similar model, in which the lack of specific legal rules regarding coordination is compensated for by Finance Ministry controls over local government borrowing.
In the last two countries to join the European Union, Romania and Bulgaria, there currently exist legal frameworks designed to coordinate the budgetary policies of their various levels of government. In the case of Romania, a Local Government Finances Law was passed in 2002; this establishes the limitations and determinants of financing via borrowing, transfers and taxation, between the central government and local authorities. Furthermore, this measure establishes a borrowing limit of 20 per cent of the total annual revenue of each local budget. Bulgaria recently formalised an agreement between the national government and subcentral levels; this established overall limits for the distribution of annual revenue and expenditure, together with legal restrictions on borrowing by subcentral governments, which must in all cases be approved by the Ministry of Finance.
Summing up, since the influence that public sector decentralization may have had on fiscal policy could be important in the countries of our sample, we decided to include in the model of the following section a variable that controls for this factor. To this end, we constructed an index which permits us to establish a ranking of the existing coordination between levels of government, using the information available and taking into account the degree of decentralization shown by the public sector in each country. The values of this variable are shown in Table 10 .
Empirical analysis and results
In order to evaluate the extent to which the budget institutions of the new EU member states, described in the two previous sections, explain the fiscal adjustments observed, we estimate the following equation: In addition, we include two economic variables to control for the effect of the cycle on fiscal policy. We use those which are most common in the literature, namely GDP growth rate ( t i GDP , ) and the unemployment rate ( t i UNEM , ). While it is true that a high inverse correlation is to be expected between the two variables, we have opted for their simultaneous inclusion, given that in transition economies labour market adjustments and economic growth do not display a clear pattern of behaviour. As we shall see, the results obtained justify this decision.
Finally, we include two other important control variables aimed at capturing the context in which these countries implemented their fiscal adjustments. The first variable controls for subjection to Pre-Accession Economic Programmes (
Although the basic objective of the PAEPs was not the institutional coordination of the fiscal policies of the candidate countries, they entailed a prior commitment towards the fiscal discipline that these countries were required to enforce following accession to the EU, in addition to presenting their Convergence Programmes. To represent the role played by the PAEPs, we use the specific index proposed by Yalloutinen (2004) . 10 The second variable is related to the existence of a framework for fiscal policy coordination between different levels of governments in the presence of fiscal decentralisation ( i t DECENTR , ). The values of both control variables are given in Table 10 .
We now present our initial hypotheses for all the variables of the model. Firstly, we expect the institutional indexes to have a positive effect on the budget balance. Thus, we expect 3 β , 4 β and 5 β to have positive signs. Secondly, we expect an increase in the annual rate of growth of real GDP (
) to lead to an improvement in the budget balance, through the functioning of the automatic stabilisers, regardless of the form in which this is incorporated into the model. Furthermore, it is foreseeable that an increase in the unemployment rate (
) will negatively affect both public revenue from taxation and social protection expenditure, thereby worsening the budgetary balance, which will cause 2 β to be lower than zero. Lastly, the signs of the other two control variables, t i PAEP , and i t DECENTR , , should also be positive, as we expect that greater fulfilment of the commitments acquired in the Pre-Accession Economic Programmes, or greater coordination between government levels, will strengthen the budget institution and encourage budgetary discipline.
Following the previous studies in the field, 11 we estimate equation (6) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), using all data in our panel with 100 observations, for 10 countries and 10 years (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . It is worth noting that when performing a longitudinal analysis of this panel, we detected the significant presence of a structural change that divides the sample into two differentiated subperiods. Strictly speaking, this is not a structural change with two clearly defined behaviour patterns, but rather a two-stage change. The first of these extends from 1994 to 1998, when the economic behaviour of the countries in our sample was far more disperse, due to the ongoing processes of democratisation, institution building and transition to a market economy. The period between 1999 and 2004 shows much greater -----10 This is a "similarity index" which aims to reflect the degree of integration existing in each country between the PAEPs and the annual budget elaboration process. Concretely, this index measures: a) whether the PAEP is the sole pluriannual budget framework; b) the coincidence of the Ministerial Departments which have the authority to approve both documents; c) the coincidence of the executive organs entrusted with their preparation; d) the coincidence of the accounting rules employed in their elaboration; e) the integration of the respective timetables; and f) the coincidence of objectives between the PAEP and the annual budget. The calculation of the index is performed using a total of 8 points (maximum identification between the two). 11 This is the method followed by analyses which use a continuous dependent variable, such as the studies by Roubini and Sachs (1989); de Haan and Sturm (1994) ; Campos and Pradhan (1996) ; Halleberg and von Hagen (1999); and Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2004) . In general, when the size of the panel data so permits, the authors use more sophisticated estimation techniques (for a review of the different possible techniques, see Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and Mulas-Granados, 2004 ). However, the only two similar studies undertaken for new EU member countries (Gleich, 2002 (Gleich, , 2003 and Yalloutinen, 2004 ) also utilise OLS. We do not include fixed effects, as this would cancel out the effect of fiscal institutions. homogeneity in all the economic and fiscal variables of the model. Consequently, we have opted, as other studies of this type have done, to estimate the model for the complete period and the two subperiods. Table 11 Results for the four regressions where the total budget balance (
was the dependent variable show the correct expected signs for all economic and institutional variables. In the four estimations, the institutional variable linked to the index of the budget execution process,
EXE t i
I , , is highly significant, while the indexes that control for the design and parliamentary approval processes are not; also significant (but at lower confidence levels) are the effects of GDP growth and the rate of unemployment on the budget balance. Neither of the two accessory institutional variables prove significant; furthermore, in the case of the PreAccession Economic Programmes, the sign is the opposite of that expected. For i t DECENTR , , however, the sign is the correct one, although its significance level is low.
Results for the four regressions where the primary budget balance ( t i GGPBB , ) was the dependent variable show the following distinctive patterns.
Again, the index of budget execution continues to be significant at a 99 per cent confidence level. And now the indexes for the design phase and the parliamentary approval phase suddenly become significant, at a 95 per cent confidence level. Another difference relates to the two economic variables of the model, which cease to be significant. And finally, i t DECENTR , turns to be also significant at a 95 per cent confidence level, thus confirming that the presence of fiscal coordination rules between different levels of government is clearly beneficial for the primary budget balance. [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] 12 and shows that the estimations improve substantially for both
The results of the estimations corresponding to the first subperiod (1994-98) have been omitted, since they display less significance than those obtained for the complete period. They are available from the authors upon request. definitions of the dependent variable. When using the total budget balance, t i GGBB , , the two macroeconomic variables appear as highly significant and show the expected signs.
Influence of Budget Institutions upon
With respect to the institutional variables, they generally show the correct signs, and they are especially significant when the dependent variable is the primary budget balance. Finally, the variables that control for Pre-accession Economic Programmes and fiscal coordination are statistically insignificant for this subperiod. Table 13 presents the results from the estimations of the basic model when we incorporate the second set of budgetary indexes and analyse the entire study period.
13 Once again, the index for the execution phase is highly significant under all specifications. Also, when we introduce the index
into the model, both variables prove to be significant simultaneously. This clearly confirms the hypothesis that having a strong Minister of Finance in the design and the execution phases is crucial for maintaining fiscal discipline, because it exerts control over public spending both before and after parliamentary discussions. GGPBB , , were now quite robust. In this subsample, the estimation of the various models improves considerably, and results resemble those already obtained with the first set of budget indexes. In all columns of Table 14 , we see that the two macroeconomic variables of the model are statistically significant. As in all previous estimations, the index for the budgetary execution phase is strongly significant. But contrary to previous results, the indexes that disaggregate the design phase of the budget process show no statistical relevance. Finally, the variables that control for the presence of PreAccession Economic Programmes and for the coordination between different levels of government are both strongly significant.
In view of the results reported from the various estimations, the explanatory power of the model is, in general, reasonably satisfactory. Given the lack of data for cyclically-adjusted budget balances beyond the time series used in this article, we believe that the use of two definitions of the dependent variable and several alternative institutional indexes has enriched the analysis. and important conclusions have been obtained. -----13 Table 14 7 Conclusions
This article aimed at analysing the influence of budget institutions on fiscal policy in the countries which joined the EU in 2005 and 2007. Since very few scholars have previously reported results in this area, this study is a pioneering work in its field.
14 One of the distinctive characteristics of our article is the combination of data from various sources, ranging from the OECD, the EU and the IMF, to a variety of analyses from national institutions of each member state in our sample.
The main results of this article confirm that budget institutions, even if recently (re)formed have already had a significant influence on fiscal outcomes in the new EU member states. This has been the case, in spite of the important explanatory power shown by other economic variables (GDP growth and unemployment rate), during the second half of our sample.
Secondly, with regard to the mechanism through which budget institutions affect budgetary balances, our results clearly show that the role of the Finance Minister in the execution phase (and sometimes in the design phase) has been a crucial factor in maintaining sound public finances in the new member states. In fact, this variable displayed strong statistical significance in the 28 different estimations we performed.
The role of the Finance Minister in the execution phase confirms the effectiveness of those institutional designs which halt Parliamentary attempts to modify the budget during the discussion and approval phase. By giving the Finance Minister the power to modify (even through simple transfers) the items initially approved by Parliament, such design guarantees the success of any budgetary consolidation episode, although it may raise some questions related to the democratic deficit in the role assigned to the legislature in those systems.
The fact that the new member states developed their budget institutions at the same time as they consolidated their transition to democratic regimes may explain why eight out of ten opted for forms of fiscal governance which favour compromise between the various Ministers with expenditure capacity, instead of stimulating delegation and strengthening the role of the Finance Minister. This choice also explains the difficulties they have all experienced in maintaining their past fiscal adjustments and the sizeable statistical impact that any improvement in the index of the Finance Minister's power has had in terms of reducing the public deficit.
-----14
Only Gleich (2002 Gleich ( , 2003 and Yalloutinen (2004) have published studies to date.
15 Hallerberg (2004) summarises the possible options to resolve the problem of fragmentation in budgetary decision-making, which basically range from solutions based upon delegation and the strengthening of the position of the Finance Minister, to rules which reinforce compromise with the fiscal discipline of the entire Cabinet. As our analysis shows, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania have adopted forms of budgetary governance based upon compromise (due principally to their multi-party political systems), and only Slovenia and Hungary have adopted mechanisms based upon delegation (both have majority systems).
Although our analysis should be replicated in the future when more fiscal data is available and institutions have been completely consolidated, we believe that this article has provided abundant evidence to support the argument that recently reformed budget institutions have already had an important influence in shaping fiscal consolidations in the new EU member states. If future research confirms that the role of fiscal institutions in the new member states is at least as important as it has been in the "old" member states, the preliminary conclusions reached by this article would become even more relevant. 
